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REFLECTION ON THE LAW REFORMING PROCESS
by Sanford J. Fox*
This paper is based on three experiences as draftsman or reporter in penal law legislation projects. The first such experience
was as sole draftsman for a New Hampshire criminal code, an
undertaking commenced in November 1967, which produced a
proposed code in April 1969.1 1 am continuing this activity at the
present time as assistant to a committee of the New Hampshire
legislature that is currently holding hearings on the proposal in
preparation for reporting out a criminal code bill this spring. Since
work on the New Hampshire code represents the most extensive
experience, it is the basis for most of the analysis in this paper.
The second stint at drafting has been as co-reporter, with three
others, in an effort to prepare a revised criminal code for Massachusetts. This effort began in October 1968, and is still progressing; almost an entire code has been drafted, with completion
expected in the next few months. The third legislative law reform
experience was in Rhode Island, where from January to April
1970, I drafted a statute designed to establish an office of special
2
prosecutors for the Rhode Island Family Court.
I. GENESIS
It is, of course, no easier to describe accurately the reasons
why a rewriting of law is undertaken than it is to find the causation of any social event of comparable complexity and magnitude.
In New Hampshire, the proximate beginnings can be traced to a
legislative resolution introduced by two lawyer-members of that
body that the criminal law be revised.3 Perhaps the fact that the
New Hampshire legislature has the smallest proportion of lawyers
of any state law-making body in the nation lent added persuasive
weight to their view that funds should be allocated in order to
redefine the shape of the law.
The Massachusetts revision, on the other hand, has had no
* Professor of Law, Boston College. A.B., 1950, University of Illinois: LL.B.. 1953
Harvard University.
1 REPORT OF COMMISSION
2

TO RECOMMEND CODIFICATION OF CRIMINAL LAWS (1969).

See Fox, Prosecutors in the Juvenile Court: A Stautory Proposal, 8 HARV. J. LEGIS.
33 (1970).
3 N.H. LAWS, 1967. ch. 45 1.
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formal legislative support. It came about partly as a result of a
report which detailed the need for a revision, written by Professor
Livingston Hall of the Harvard Law School, at the request of the
Massachusetts Committee on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. 4 There has been, however, a widespread and
longstanding awareness of the deplorable condition of the state's
penal law. Funds for the project were granted by a Boston charitable foundation to a specially formed organization known as the
Massachusetts Criminal Law Revision Commission.
Rhode Island presents still another contrast in respect to immediate background. Here the first step was an executive decision. A
crisis in the legal representation of the state in family court matters arose when the city solicitor of Providence announced that
due to the pressure of duties in other courts, his staff could no
longer perform a prosecutorial function in the family court of the
state's largest city and capital. The Attorney General, a prospective gubernatorial candidate, announced that he would step into
the breach, and assume responsibility for family court, and all
other court prosecutions. The Governor asked the Chief Justice
of the state supreme court to form a committee of judges to study
the matter. The committee sought my help in producing a report
and drafting legislation to implement their recommendations. 5 The
Governor's budget bore the cost of the work.
These descriptions report only the immediate circumstances
behind the origins of the reform efforts. There is undoubtedly an
element of "me-too-ism" involved as well. The Model Penal Code
and the enactment of new codes by several states during the
recent past have exerted a strong influence to reevaluate a body of
law which many have known to require revision. 6 The availability
of federal, state and private funds to support law reform is, of
course, another significant causal factor. It should also be noted
that these projects are largely the domain of law school graduates,
for whom the basic criminal law course has, of late, increasingly
placed a strong emphasis on legislative policy problems. The
central focus of some casebooks, notably that edited by the late
4 GOVERNOR'S COMMITTEE ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
REVISION OF THE MASSACHUSETTS CRIMINAL CODE (1968).

5 See note 2 supra.
6 Of central historical importance is the background of the Model Penal Code. Several
documents which demonstrate major ideational roots of the Code, e.g., Michael & Wechsler, Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 701 (1937); J. MICHAEL & M.
ADLER, CRIME, LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (1933); J. MICHAEL & H. WECHSLER, CASES
AND MATERIALS IN CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION (1940), make it clear that

the thinking at Columbia and Chicago in the 1930's played a decisive historical role. It
would be of great value to the historian of the criminal law if Professor Wechsler could be
persuaded to provide his own significant recollections of this period.
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Jerome Michael and Herbert Wechsler, 7 have served to highlight
the need for legislative action.
I1. PARTICIPANTS
The New Hampshire resolution resulted in the appointment of
a three-man Criminal Law Revision Commission, chaired by
Frank R. Kenison, Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of
New Hampshire. The other members were a practicing attorney
with a specialty in criminal defense work, who became secretary
of the ommission, and the clerk of the superior court (general
jurisdiction) in one of the more populous counties, who became
the Commission's treasurer.
In Massachusetts, there are several levels of personnel. The
Law Revision Commission proper is made up of fifty-five persons,
each of whom serves on the Executive Committee and/or on a
drafting subcommittee. The Commission as a whole has final
responsibility for the proposed criminal code that will emerge.
The Executive Committee is composed of four law professors,
four practicing lawyers, two well-known trial court judges, three
members of the state's House of Representatives, the district
attorney and sheriff of two large counties, the Director of the
Division of Legal Medicine of the Massachusetts State Mental
Health Department, a deputy superintendant from the Boston
Police Department, the State Commissioner of Probation, the
Attorney General, and the Director of the Committee on Law
Enforcement. Professor Hall is chairman of the Executive Committee as well as each of the four subcommittees to which every
reporter initially submits his drafts. There are approximately
twelve members of each subcommittee.
As already indicated, the Rhode Island group responsible for
the family court legislation draft was composed entirely of judges.
The chairman was Hon. John E. Mullen, Presiding Justice of the
superior court; the others were the Chief Judge and an Associate
Judge of the family court; the Chief Judge of the district court;
and an Associate Justice of the superior court.
There are significant variations in degree of participation of
these various personages in the reform proceedings. In New
Hampshire and Rhode Island, the meetings to consider policy
problems, drafts and other matters looking toward the goal of
legislation entailed a near perfect attendance record. The Massachusetts record is not at all comparable. At one session of the
7

J. MICHAEL & H. WECHSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS
ADMINISTRATION (1940).

IN CRIMINAL
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drafting committee, no one appeared but Professor Hall and myself.8 Other meetings, both of the subcommittee and Executive
Committee, have often attracted no more than three or four
others; some Commission members have never put in an appearance. Meetings of the fifty-five man Commission as a whole have
involved about a dozen members. 9
These comparisons require consideration of how to account for
the discrepancy in participation. One possible explanation is that
in New Hampshire and Rhode Island the reforming process has
entailed strong deferential relationships that are notably lacking in
Massachusetts. At the head of the enterprise in each of the former
states, one finds the Chief Justice of the state supreme court. As
an abstract matter, it may well be that the Roscoe Pound Professorship at the Harvard Law School is an equally prestigious,
influential and revered position. But the important comparison is
not of that sort; rather it is more a matter of how the other
members of the working group relate to the leadership position. In
New Hampshire and Rhode Island these participants are other
judges, a practicing attorney, and a court clerk, all of whom are
well used to entertaining and displaying a degree of respect for
their Chief Justices which effectively precluded their choice about
withholding the participation they had promised. In Rhode Island,
moreover, while appointments to the committee were made by the
Chief Justice, the actual work of the group was chaired by the
jurist who presided over the court immediately below the supreme
court of the state, thereby reinforcing the closely-knit professional
relationships involved for the other judges on the committee. It
must be added, however, that reference to these relationships
should by no means obscure the fact that the Rhode Island and
New Hampshire participants were conscientious individuals from
the outset.
Yet, so might be those in Massachusetts who have failed to
appear: the majority of those in question have all achieved a
notable degree of success in law, law enforcement, medicine and
related professional fields, which could hardly have occurred
without their having a keenly developed sense of responsibility.
8 We completed the subcommittee's scheduled business nonetheless.
9 The New Hampshire meetings all were held in Concord, N.H. They commenced in the
morning and usually extended to mid-afternoon. Discussions of the work usually continued
over lunch at a nearby restaurant. In Rhode Island, I normally met with the committee of
judges in early afternoon, although several evening meetings were undertaken when there
were other commitments during the day.
The meetings to review drafts were held most frequently in Rhode Island where the
intervals were never more than two weeks. In New Hampshire, three weeks was the
general practice, although during the summers there was sometimes a four or five week
gap. Massachusetts meetings average an interval of approximately four weeks.
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There is little basis for distinguishing them on this issue from the
participants in the other two states. What is markedly different is
that the professional deference owed by a lower court judge, or
any other active member of the legal profession, to his state's
chief justice, has no real counterpart in the relationship between
law professor on the one hand, and police, prosecutors, corrections administrators, practicing lawyers and behavioral scientists,
on the other. There is, in fact, a good deal to suggest that academic lawyers (and appellate courts) frequently find themselves in
opposing ideological camps from these latter participants in the
criminal process.
This might constitute a partial explanation of why the Massachusetts people felt so little motivation to participate as compared with that found in the other states, and why there might
even have been some enticement to stay away. To these considerations should be added observations relating to the nature of the
discussions at the various meetings. These often involved the
propounding of hypothetical cases, one varied somewhat from the
other, as a means of testing whether the rule proposed in the draft
under consideration solves the right sorts of problems, or goes too
far, or not far enough, in its coverage. With no obvious transitions, the issue might then be shifted to whether the draft expresses a policy agreeable to all with the peculiar elegance of
statutory language: for example, the lawyers would ask whether
the suches, the whereins, the howevers, the provisos, and the
commas or semicolons were all in the right place, whether the
qualifying phrase qualified all it was meant to qualify, and whether
the meaning would be more clear if this paragraph or that were
divided into subparagraphs, or consolidated into larger entities.
The similarity of meetings conducted in this manner to what
goes on in law school classrooms and in courts is, of course, no
coincidence given the professional biases of the discussion leaders. The meetings proceed with the verbal razzle-dazzle, semantic
nit-picking and enthusiasm for the minutia of syntax that is the
stock and trade of lawyers. One can hardly blame the police
officer, the correctional administrator, or the social scientist who
feels left out of and not impressed with such esoterica.
The absence of law enforcement persons from the Massachusetts Executive Committee meetings might futher be explained by
a possible anticipation of an inability to have their view adopted
by the group and incorporated into the proposed legislation. It is
not only procedural law that presents issues which divide police
and prosecutors from civil libertarians, although the large number
of Supreme Court decisions in the sixties over questions of proce-

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 4:3

dural law has made it appear that the division in thought is over
procedural rights. A code of substantive criminal law poses kindred questions. Justification rules, in particular the matter of when
police may shoot people, is an obvious example. The scope of the
offense of resisting arrest, whether there should be an open-ended
crime of breach of the peace or vagrancy, and how much a
conspirator should be required to aid the state in frustrating accomplishment of the conspiratorial object before he is granted a
defense to his own criminal liability for the conspiracy are all
issues in which police and prosecutors have a vital professional
concern. The law abounds in others. Nevertheless, the police and
prosecutors did not participate to assert their interests. A possible
explanation may be that the experience of one highly publicized
defeat after another, from Mapp' ° through Miranda" and
Davis,'2 may well have created the impression that penal law
reform is so essentially an anti-law enforcement and criminal-coddling affair that to advocate the less libertarian view would
be an exercise in futility. How long it will take for them fully to
realize how different the present decade bodes to be,13 is hard to
tell.
Perhaps I can pose a somewhat negative hypothesis on this
question which can be substantiated or negated by other experiences reported in this symposium. Perhaps having a strong
professional interest in the state of the penal law is not a significant guarantee that persons with that interest will assume any
responsibility for changing it. This leaves a great deal unsaid-such as why people accept appointments to law revising
bodies in the first place-but the hypothesis may be a useful
caveat to future undertakings of this sort.
New Hampshire furnishes the opportunity to make several
observations in regard to the non-participation of police in the
drafting of the proposed code. There were no law enforcement
representatives among us when the code was first assembled,' 4
but they have since appeared as articulate advocates before the
10
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). (Applied 4th Amendment exclusionary rule to
the states).
11Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). (Requires constitutional warnings to be
given a suspect whenever he is deprived of his freedom for purposes of police interrogation).
12Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969). (Applied 4th Amendment exclusionary
rule to fingerprints obtained at an involuntary investigatory detention).
13
See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970). (Upholding Georgia's co-conspirator
hearsay exception as valid under the Confrontation Clause of the 6th Amendment, even
though it did not comply with the hearsay exception applicable in federal conspiracy
trials).
14 It should be noted, however, that Chief Justice Kenison, as a former state prosecutor,
brought valuable experience as the people's advocate to our deliberations. The other two
members of the Commission conducted informal discussions concerning the progress of
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legislative committee that has been considering the code. As a
result, it is clear that their participation in the drafting phase
would have made a difference in the nature of the proposal. For
example, we drew the line between misdemeanor and the lowest
grade of felony at five hundred dollars for the offense of fraudulent use of a credit card. Subsequently, at the public hearings, the
police indicated that tourists in New Hampshire who committed
this offense could be extradited from their home states only if they
were charged with a felony, that most of the fraud was for less
than five hundred dollars, and that a credible threat of extradition was necessary in order to induce the offender to compensate the loss of the New Hampshire businessman. Had we
known this initially, the offense would have been graded
differently to take this problem into account.
Police participation might well have made a difference in our
draft in some other cases as well, although in these instances I am
not nearly so certain. An example of this sort would be the rules
governing police use of deadly force. These rules evoked scathing
criticism by the New Hamphsire police chiefs at the committee
hearings. They contended that once criminals knew that the law
did not allow police to shoot at them ("over their heads" was the
phrase uniformly used in the testimony), they would all be able to
evade arrest except insofar as track stars could be recruited to the
force who could be counted on to catch and subdue fleeing felons.
As a result of the hearings in which these predictions were made
and the discussions by the committee in executive session, it
appears that the police view will prevail in the bill to be reported
out. Had the advocates of this position participated in the Commission's deliberations in Chief Justice Kenison's chambers, I
suspect that a majority of the Commission would have been
amenable to submitting a justification provision in keeping with
police urgings. I would not have supported this, but when my
opinion conflicted with that of the Commission, the policy of the
Commission prevailed.
There are other instances, however, where articulation of the
police position would clearly have had no effect. In New Hampshire, as well as in Massachusetts and many other states, police
officers prosecute cases in the lower criminal courts. At the New
Hampshire hearings, police complained that the presence of
words such as "knowingly" or "purposely" in the code put an
unfair burden on them. Those testifying before the committee
the revision with police officers with whom they were brought into contact by their
business in the courts. In addition, the Commission was aided on several occassions by
formal written comments concerning parts of the Code from the office of the state's
Attorney General.
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expressed concern for how they were to prove what was going on
in another man's mind. Proof of what the defendant did was
considered, by the police position, to be sufficient. The
co-chairmen of the legislative committee, both being members of
the bar, and I tried quite unsuccessfully to persuade the police
witnesses that mens rea was an essential part of our criminal
jurisprudence and that circumstantial proof was the usual way in
which this element is established. Eventually the police acquiesced to our position on the issue, though for reasons which
were far from clear to them. Undoubtedly the result would have
been the same had the issue been presented to the Commission at
the drafting stage.
It was quite evident from the committee hearings that the
police constitute a segment of the public to which legislators on
the committee pay keen attention. There is no reason why this is
not true of members of the New Hampshire legislature generally.
It would appear, therefore, that unless at least some of the police
views are incorporated into the bill which is finally presented to
the legislature, its passage would be in grave jeopardy.
What the consequences of non-participation are in regard to
others, particularly prosecutors 15 and other lawyers, is more
difficult to assess. As to the former, I would expect that their
influence in the legislature will gain for them all of the concessions
that could have been obtained in the drafting, and more. In this
respect, the penal code that finally emerges will reflect the prosecutors' views to the extent that they choose to make the views
known to the legislature. It would simply have been more convenient and efficient to incorporate the opinions of police and
prosecutors from the outset. At this point in the legislative process, only one written communication has been received from a
county attorney. What consequences will follow from the absence
of more lawyers from the New Hampshire and Massachusetts
work remains to be seen. Three or four concentrating minds can
accomplish as much as seven or eight, and probably a good deal
more than twelve, when it comes to the niceties of drafting and
the exploration of policy. However, the degree of influence leading members of the criminal bar have with the legislature, and the
direction the influence might take, cannot yet be reported.
III. THE DRAFTING PROCESS
In New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts, drafts
15 See

note 14 supra.
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were mailed to members of the group with whom I was working in
advance of a meeting to discuss them. In Massachusetts, notwithstanding the fact that there are four reporters working on the
criminal code, we have not exchanged drafts in the early stages,
but are undertaking to evaluate each other's work prior to action
by the Commission on the entire code. In all three states, a
substantial amount of rewriting was invariably required to incorporate the suggestions agreed upon at these meetings. These
suggestions were sometimes prefaced with a "Look here, professor," indicating that I was about to be chastised for viewing things
from the ivory tower of academia. On the whole, however, there
was a remarkable degree of consensus among the participants in
the discussions. Where disagreement arose, I have always considered it my role to produce draft legislation which reflects the view
of the committee or commission, rather than my own. The legalistic nature of the discussions has already been indicated.
Properly anticipating the reaction that the draft legislation
might produce has presented a problem in all three states. In
Rhode Island this specifically emerged as a matter of whether the
prosecutors' office which was to be recommended to the Governor for the family court should be tailored in such a way as to
minimize its cost. The draft legislation still sits on the Governor's
desk, largely, I am told, because of a reluctance to seek an
appropriation for it from a very money-conscious legislature. In
New Hampshire and Massachusetts, anticipating the legislative
reaction has been very important, particularly in determining
whether the expected opposition to radical changes in such sensitive areas as abortion, capital punishment, homosexuality, and the
like would be strong enough to jeopardize the whole code. The
question we have been forced to face is whether the passionate
feelings aroused by these problems of great socio-legal significance would be likely to somehow taint other recommendations
dealing with such relatively uncontroversial problems as consolidating the various theft offenses under one heading. Individuals
within the committees and commissions have assessed this risk
differently. Some advocate proposing reform that is considered
appropriate, regardless of the possible legislative reaction. Others
evade the issue of what shape the reform ought to take by insisting that it is too risky to propose anything radically different
from what we now have. It is interesting that individual legislators
reflect a somewhat different balance of views. Proponents of
reform seem to agree that passage of an entire code might be
imperilled if radical changes on delicate issues were to be included. They favor submission of separate bills, so that the bulk
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of penal law reform could be considered free from emotion-laden
controversy.
The fact that there have been so many penal law codification
efforts going on at the same time has been both a help and a
hinderance in the task of producing draft legislation. Their large
number has, on the one hand, provided a rich source of substantive ideas and drafting forms with which to work. This very asset
has, however, made it appear at times that there can be an almost
unending variety of alternatives to consider, so much so that the
need to get on with the work has often dictated that somewhat
arbitrary choices be made. Examples of this would be the necessity of drawing numerical lines in order to define the number of
people needed to constitute a riot, the age at which a person
should cease to be a minor for purposes of making others responsible for his moral welfare, the amount of dollars which need to be
lost in a theft or an arson before the degree of the offense becomes more serious, the number of days which should elapse
before a complainant against a child loses his right to appeal a
prosecutor's refusal to initiate proceedings against the child, and
the appropriate time period in which a sex offense victim should
be required to make a complaint or for a general statute of
limitations. There are, of course, some rough guidelines for making some of these decisions. Inflation dictates that dollar figures
be presumptively raised from what they have been in the statutes.
Changes in relevant social relations and biological facts, bringing
an earlier maturity for young people, suggest that ages be lowered
in most instances. Analogous state statutes governing time periods for filing legal papers of various sorts are useful in resolving
some of the time problems. But in the final analysis, the resolution
of such questions does not yield to the formulation of rational
policy, and one is left with the uneasiness of having made essentially arbitrary choices.
The prior discussion far from exhausts the problem of variety.
The circumstances of a confinement that make it kidnapping instead of some lesser offense, and the kind of threat that must be
presented to a householder in order to justify his use of deadly
force against an intruder are other illustrations where widely
disparate statutory provisions appear. After a start in New Hampshire that entailed checking all the recent legislation before beginning a draft, I came to rely primarily on the Model Penal Code,
the New York Penal Law, and the 1967 Michigan draft. This not
only alleviated the problem of unmanageable variety, but also
permitted an insight into the critical development of the law. For
example, the New York law shows obvious influences of the
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Model Penal Code, while the Michigan draft often included explicit reference to variations in both of these in arriving at its own
position. In all three of these documents, moreover, the presence
of extensive and learned commentary proved of great value. Prior
to the appearance of these documents in Michigan and New
York, there existed in both states a detailed statutory treatment of
substantive criminal law. It therefore became possible to determine when a particular provision could be accounted for by the
existence of relevant statutory predecessors, and when a conscious departure from the past had been produced. Reliance on
these same sources was followed in Massachusetts, except that
additional reference was made to the New Hampshire draft.
This referential scheme has not, as might initially be supposed,
resulted in substantial similarity between the New Hampshire
code and that part of the Massachusetts code for which I have
been responsible. In fact, often there is little resemblance at all.
The discrepancy can be explained by examining the different
forms a code may take in order to fulfill varying roles. A code is
commonly viewed as a body of law that will settle all possible
disputes that might arise, or at least as many as can be provided
for by the collective imagination of the drafters. From this perspective, the criminal code needs to be detailed and specific,
resembling in many ways a contract drawn by a lawyer desirous
of providing for every contingency. The Massachusetts drafts are
of this sort, but the New Hampshire code is not.
The drafting experience in the latter state reflected a desire for
parsimony in the use of statutory language, eschewing complex
details wherever possible. In large measure this approach was
adopted on account of the relatively few lawyers among the lower
court judges and in the legislature of New Hampshire. Lengthy
provisions, bristling with whereins, provisos, exceptions, and exceptions to the exceptions could hardly be thoroughly understood
by these laymen; and, not being understood, might well be rejected. The drafting of the New Hampshire code was also guided
by a persistent effort to measure the need for complexity. In an
early chapter dealing with the basis for criminal liability, for
example, we simply provided that a voluntary act was required.
Provisions spelling out the treatment of the problems of reflex
actions and automatisms were not included-a result that came
about after Judge Kenison suggested that no serious person would
consider sleep walking or the thrashings of an epileptic as voluntary acts. 16 It was not infrequent that other detailed drafts were
16 Cf. Fox, Physical Disorder, Consciousness, and Criminal Liability, 63 COLUM. L.
REV. 655 (1963).
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met, and demolished, by the consideration of whether the result
would be any different if the provision were omitted. It is, of
course, true that one can think up the hypothetical case that
would make it desirable to have the detailed statutory solution. In
Massachusetts, the draft provides for the occurrence of virtually
all possibilities, at least all that could be thought of at a given time
and place. To the contrary, in New Hampshire there was always
the effort to determine whether the instance being considered was
simply a remote possibility that might occur once in a century, if
that often. In such cases, the decision was made not to deal
explicitly with the problem in the draft. There are, of course,
some places where the law is irreducibly complicated, and there
was no alternative but to reflect the complexity in the proposed
code. The best example of this is perhaps the law relating to
justification for the use of force, involving rules based upon the
shifting identity of an aggressor in an affray. Quite predictably, the
chapter on justification produced a great deal of questioning in the
committee of the New Hampshire legislature, and in the end, it
appears to me that much of it was accepted largely because of
respect for Judge Kenison's opinion that it made sense.
IV.

THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

In discussing the legislative process, there is only the New
Hampshire experience, which is still incomplete, to draw upon.
Following publication of the proposed code, I spoke to a meeting
of the lower court judges of the state and to the annual meeting of
the New Hampshire Police Chiefs' Association. In both instances, I accomplished little more than to inform them of the
existence of a proposed criminal code. Due to the fact that the
published report containing the code was sent only to members of
the state bar, many of the judges, who are laymen, had not
received it and therefore had no familiarity on which I could draw
in a discussion with them. The police chiefs evinced little interest
in discussing the code, even the rules on arrest and use of force in
law enforcement which I called to their attention. I offered to
return to both groups at their convenience to explain the provisions of the code in greater detail, but no invitations developed.
Moreover, I wrote a description of the work of the Commission
and of the major provisions of the code in the New Hampshire
Bar Journal; 1 7 however, as far as I know, little response from the
bar was forthcoming. In view of these experiences, I fully ex17

Fox, Proposed Criminal Code for New Hampshire, I I N.H.B.J. 262 (1969).
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pected that when public hearings were held by the legislature,
hardly anyone would appear.
This expectation was, in part, fulfilled. A joint committee of the
judiciary committees of the House and Senate was formed to
consider the report of the Commission. Since the New Hampshire
legislature formally convenes only every other year, the committee first met as an interim body. At the first meeting of the
committee, nine months after the code was published in the report
of the Commission, all members of the Commission appeared and
spoke briefly of the way the Commission had operated. I described the overall nature of the code, emphasizing that it did
away with common law crimes by providing four classifications of
offenses that would govern the sentencing of all offenders, and the
importance of bringing some order into the mens rea elements of
the criminal jurisprudence. As subsequent encounters with the
committee revealed, few of these descriptions were entirely understood.
Following this first meeting, I began work on a supplementary
report for the Commission, dealing with a number of important
items. Professor Wechsler, to whom the report and code had been
sent, made several useful suggestions concerning the sentencing
provisions of the code which the Commission decided to adopt. In
addition, the early sections of the code, dealing with general
principles applicable to offenses defined in other parts of the New
Hampshire statutes, was a matter of some concern to the Commission on the ground that the legislature would not be fully
cognizant of the impact of these provisions on the so-called "outside" offense unless the Commission called attention to just what
the effects would be. 18 A major source of hesitation was the
provision converting absolute liability offenses to the lowest classification of offenses under the code (violations), for which no
imprisonment penalty was authorized. The Commission suspected, and quite rightly as research demonstrated, that there
were a number of absolute liability offenses that carried substantial prison terms. Upon reflection the Commission decided that
the change of all absolute liability offenses to offenses of minimal
seriousness should be effected by legislative consideration of the
proper penalty for each individual offense rather than the automatic conversion wrought by the code. I undertook, therefore, to
redraft the several hundred offenses which carried either any
incarceration penalty, or a fine of more than $100, retaining absolute liability for some and changing others to culpable crimes.
18 See Fox, Statutory Crimina" Law: The Neglected Part, 52 J.
(1961).
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Although the specific aim of this part of the supplementary
report was to produce recommendations to the Commission concerning what should be retained as absolute liability and what
should be made into culpability offenses, my work included
changing the existing statutory mens rea terminology into that
which had been adopted in the code, and substituting the classification plan of the code for the fine and imprisonment penalty
phrases of the present offenses. Thus, the "maliciously" of the
present law became the "purposely" or "knowingly" of the code;
and the "shall be imprisoned for not more than one year" became
"shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
While this redrafting was being completed, the legislative committee commenced a series of four public hearings where three of
four members of the committee on legislation of the New Hampshire Police Chiefs Association appeared. Although the first public hearing was in October 1970, approximately seventeen months
after I had appeared at their annual meeting to describe the code
which had been published a month earlier, the testimony of the
chiefs was that many of their members had not been able to get a
copy and were not, therefore, fully prepared to comment on its
provisions. The committee had more copies printed. As some
indication of the impact my earlier remarks had made, one of the
chiefs told the committee that they had met with me "two or three
years earlier."
Once the chiefs did their homework, however, they were quite
effective. They commented intelligently on a wide range of provisions in the code, asked for clarification of the meaning of others,
and generally constituted the major source of public reaction to
the proposal. The members of the legislature who sat on the
committee accorded them a respectful and warm reception and,
except for the proposal that mens rea be eliminated from the
penal law, the committee seems prepared to report out a bill that
will reflect the bulk of the suggestions made by the chiefs.
No member of the judiciary appeared at the public hearings.
No one from the correctional system appeared to say anything
concerning the sentencing provisions, or anything else. No members of the bar appeared. No one from the Chamber of Commerce
or the general business community appeared, in spite of the presence of much law in the code dealing with theft, fraud, deceptive
business practices, and other subjects of interest to the world of
commerce. Although there are provisions dealing with public
offenders and the political process, no one in government service
appeared to speak on behalf of himself or other public servants.
The code proposes a change in the New Hampshire abortion
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laws along the lines recommended by the Model Penal Code. This
section attracted numerous witnesses to the public hearing, all
testifying that the change was, by far, too minimal. The Civil
Liberties Union, the Zero Population Growth organization, various representatives of Protestant groups, and individual women
all spoke at length in favor of giving the physician and his patient
exclusive authority to make the abortion decision. No one testified in favor of leaving the law as it is. 19 The chairman of the
committee pointed out to each witness that in the fall, each
candidate for the governor's office had pledged to veto any change
in the abortion laws. The witnesses persisted in their support,
however, suggesting that the legislature's responsibility was
different from the governor's, obviously trying to concentrate
their fire in one place at a time.
The representative of the New Hampshire and American Civil
Liberties Union also spoke against two other provisions of the
Code: continuation of the death penalty, and the present proscriptions against fornication and sodomy. Since the bill has not even
been reported out by the committee, it may be premature to
predict what the ultimate nature of the new penal code will be.
Nevertheless, I have little doubt that it will repeal the current
New Hampshire law on abortion and sodomy. There may be a
small, but insignificant, narrowing of the circumstances in which
capital punishment may be imposed, and fornication may become
a more limited offense than it now is.20 On these matters of sexual
morality, abortion and the death penalty, the enormous influence
of one particular newspaper in the state can be seen time and
again. There has already been extremely reactionary editorializing, in highly emotional terms, on these and other issues raised by
the proposed code. It seems to be the rare legislator who is
prepared to become the specific object of the paper's scorn.
Following the public hearings, the committee has gone into
executive session, where it is as of the time of this writing. The
Office of Legislative Services has not only reproduced transcripts
of the public hearings for the committee's use, but has developed
a tabular view of the comments that relate to each section of the
code that was the subject of testimony. These documents have
been invaluable to the committee's deliberations in reviewing the
individual sections of the code-voting approval, amendment or
19 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN., §§ 585:12, 585:13 (1955) prohibit all abortion efforts, except
that after the child is quick and on the advice of two physicians, the pregnancy may be
terminated
in order to save the life of the woman.
20
There is some suggestion afoot that fornication be prohibited only if it is committed in
public.
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deletion of the provisions that will compose the bill they will
report to the legislature. Chief Justice Kenison and I have continued to sit with the committee in its weekly meetings, providing
what background, explanation and advice the committee needs.
Once a bill has been reported, it will be referred to the standing
committees on judicial matters of each house. Whether the long
process of committee work will be repeated following this referral
is doubtful, since the standing committees will be made up largely
of those who have been on the interim committee. But there will
be other legislators whose opinions must be heard and advice
considered, and just how much more time will be consumed
before the legislature as a whole considers a new penal code is far
from certain. Current expectations are that the legislature will act
before it completes its business this summer. If it does, it will
have taken slightly over two years from the time the proposed
code was first published, and almost four years from the time the
first drafting began.
Legislative time will not be consumed by consideration of the
drafts of the "outside" offense which I did for the supplementary
report of the Commission. It has become obvious that review of
these provisions is more than the interim committee and the rest
of the legislative process can now undertake. Since the largest
uncertainty about these offenses is generated by the provision of
the code making all absolute liability offenses subject only to a
fine, that provision of the code will probably be deleted. Such a
deletion is, of course, at the expense of the principle advocated by
the Commission that a person who is subjectively not culpable
ought not to be sent to prison. Nevertheless, there is the consolation that this result seldom, if ever, obtains, in spite of its legal
possibility. There is also a vague expectation that the Office of
Legislative Services will one day submit a "house-cleaning" bill
that will accomplish this change in the law.
The classification of all offenses, wherever defined, into the
groupings of the code, and the applicability of one sentencing
structure raise similar questions of amending laws not specifically
before the legislature. However, since I had already identified the
outside offenses, I could indicate as to each of them what the
effect of the classification and sentencing provisions would be. In
any event, little difficulty is expected in getting this accepted,
since in almost all cases the net result is to increase the penalty
that is now provided.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

Yet undescribed is the consideration of the extent to which the
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final drafts from the three law reforming experiences reflect the
personal views of the drafter. In the Rhode Island report, the
opinion that the hostile procedures of the law should be controlled
in juvenile proceedings was broadly shared by all members of the
judges' committee. As a result, the draft legislation conveyed to
the Governor in the report was the product of our joint efforts to
write legislation appropriately expressing this shared intent. The
central idea of manipulating the role of the prosecution, in order
to preserve as much of the welfare philosophy of the family court
as possible, was sufficiently my own idea that I would not hesitate
to be identified with it. This feeling that the Rhode Island draft is
essentially "mine" contrasts sharply with the way I can view the
products of the New Hampshire and Massachusetts efforts. In
these states I found the role of reporter to be essentially that of a
technician, with relatively little opportunity to produce a body of
law reflecting personal views.
There are many reasons why drafting a penal code appears to
be uncreative in this sense. To a large extent the criminal law, no
matter how decrepit, embodies values that cannot be altered.
Persons and property need to be protected from a variety of
invasions, and issues such as whether murder is to be an offense
with different degrees, which felonies are to be included in a
felony murder rule, and what the role of provocation is to be are
relatively minor matters encompassing severely limited choices.
In addition, so much of the creative change in traditional penal
law has already been considered in the work that produced the
Model Penal Code, that little more than variations on a theme can
be proposed in a new criminal code. It is true that there have been
many codifications since the appearance of the ALI's Proposed
Official Draft in 1963 that have differed in many respects from the
Model Penal Code, but these are nonetheless, still in the nature of
more or less elaborate variations. The New Hampshire experience suggests, moreover, that the legislative process regarding
penal reform operates so as to minimize sharp departures from
tradition. The police appear to play a major role in this, almost as
if they, rather than any legislative body, speak for the public at
large; and it is commonplace to note that the law enforcement
community is generally quite conservative.
If these observations about the role of the reporter are accurate, then it would make much sense to strive to create a permanent body of civil servants whose job it would be to supervise,
on a continuing basis, the development of the criminal law. Thus,
when some feeling exists that the present statutes need to be
changed, these civil employees should be able to determine the
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realistic possibilities and analyze the relevant attitudes in order to
devise proposed changes for presentation to the legislature.
A second point that emerges relates to the nature of the experience that is brought to the drafting of a penal code, and the
expectations that arise from it. The drafting process is often
significantly influenced by the experiences the participants have
had in the criminal process. Defense lawyers are aware of one
sort of need for change; trial judges of another; criminal law
professors see the problems from still a different perspective.
None of these individuals, however, can validly propose generalizations concerning what now occurs or predict what is likely to
result if one provision or another is enacted. There is no assurance, in other words, that the declarations of experience are
representative. But the law is enacted to produce desired results,
whether there be change or a continuation of the status quo. After
all is said and done, however, to find out what the new criminal
process is like in one detail or another, we still end up asking a
judge, a lawyer, a policeman, etc.; we will know no more of value
about life under the new law than we discovered we did under the
old law. It seems most desirable, therefore, that penal law revision
be accompanied by some provision for monitoring, by way of
gathering already existing statistics, by generating new statistics,
by interviewing representative samples of officials or citizens
whose reports can be of value, or by any other means the creative
social science imagination can provide. Some legislatures have
already enacted a rule that legislation calling for an expenditure of
public funds must include a price tag or estimate of just how much
the legislative program will cost. It would be similarly wise to
provide that no change in the penal law be enacted unless it is
accompanied by some provision for determining, over some appropriate period of time what the effect of the law turns out to be.
In some areas, a degree of monitoring is already built in. Abortion
reform, for example, relies heavily on the use of medical facilities
that are used to keeping records and publishing statistics. Yet, we
have no idea what changes, if any, would take place in the arrest
rate if there were a radical change in the law regarding circumstances when the officer could shout: "Stop or I'll shoot."
This is not to say that the state of the law will always be
determined by the state of life it purports to govern. There are
sufficient indications that many people regard the penal law as a
code of morality whose role it is to approve or disapprove, rather
than to regulate. But even under such a view, it would be important to know what is gained and what is lost by the particular
shape of the law on issues that are viewed as pointed moral
questions.

